Judge Alito's interpretation of Executive power knows no checks. He does not think that George Bush is above the law, for the reason that GWB is the Law of the land.
The President is not above the law, but he's yet to say he is below all of the law. The law is above people, we are a nation of laws.Bush is the Law's equal in the eyes of his cousin by marriage Sam Alito.
The key language to any Alito interpretation of power is in the language offered. No doubt Samuel Alito thinks there is a compelling case for Executive authority.
The use of compelling would be a key. this is synonymous with the act of rendering detainees. A compelling case would be the literal justification in and of itself to arbitrary police action.
Samueal Alito's interpretation of Executive authority sides with just such action, the extreme prejudice of these actions in and of itself justifies its use and needs no other endorsed or established grounds for legality.
Clearly he sides with the State against anyone who petitions grounds for asylum and due process, as a minority opinion he did so regarding a Chinese man who feared government persecution for his having voiced opinion against government policy.
Alito was the lone dissent in his finding that the Chinese man was still technically bound by procedure to check in with his embassy and face possible detainment during his asylum petition process:
[img]Chang testified that he decided not to inform on his colleagues without better information. A.R. 113, 115-16
(Chang's testimony that " he wouldn't like to do this" before he obtained "new evidence" to "make sure" of their intentions). This was certainly a humane and under- standable decision. But, contrary to the majority's conclu- sion, there is no evidence that it was a political decision. According to the majority, a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to find that "Chang failed to report his fel- low delegates based solely on his disagreement with the punishment that they were likely to face at the hands of the Chinese government." Maj. Op. at 13. The majority holds that Chang "manifested opposition to the Chinese government" by "defying the orders of the Chinese gov- ernment because he disagreed with how they would treat those suspected of trying to defect." Maj. Op. **45 at
14. These conclusions are belied by Chang's own testi- mony.
At no time has Chang said that he opposes the Chinese law prohibiting defection; at no time has Chang said that he opposes the punishment that his colleagues would have faced if he had reported them; and at no time has Chang said that he opposes the Chinese government's require- ment that a delegation leader surveill his fellow delegees. Indeed, so far as the record reflects, Chang has never ar- ticulated any political opinion at odds with the Chinese government. Rather, his testimony makes it clear that his unwillingness to report his colleagues was based solely on his uncertainty regarding their true intentions. As Chang explains in his brief, he
made a conscious choice not to contact the
Embassy. He reasoned that he did not want to report the individual unless he was abso- lutely sure of his intentions. In the event that he chose to report an individual to the gov- ernment, that individual would suffer severe repercussions. He did not want to cause any problems for individuals who may be other- wise innocent.
Petitioner's Br. at 7 (emphasis added). See also A.R. 12
(same; Chang's brief before the BIA); **46 A.R. 115-
17 (Chang's testimony that " he wouldn't like to -- to report them to the Chinese embassy" "before he could make clear" their true intentions); A.R. 122 (Chang's tes- timony that it was "hard . . . to make a decision" because there was "no way to make-- make sure" of his colleagues' plans); A.R. 113.
Rather than representing political opposition to China's state security law, Chang's conduct simply reflects a concern for accuracy in its enforcement. See Chang Br. at 31 (Chang's conduct was intended "to avoid false ac- cusations of an otherwise innocent individual"). Such a concern is honorable, but
I fail to see how it compels the factual conclusion that Chang "defied" the Chinese gov- ernment because he held a political opinion contrary to the state security law. n10 Accordingly, I dissent.
n10 The majority holds that, for a variety of reasons, the evidence compels the conclusion that China's motive in prosecuting Chang for violating the state security law is, in part, political. Maj. Op. at 15-16. Because of its conclusion that Chang's conduct was based "on political grounds," the ma- jority does not need to reach the question whether an asylum applicant can show the requisite fear of persecution "on account of . . . political opinion" where he in fact has manifested no political opin- ion but his home country's government erroneously imputes to him a disfavored political opinion. See Maj. Op. at 17 n.7. I am not aware of any case in which an asylum applicant prevailed on a claim of "persecution" on account of "political opinion" where he did not hold any political opinion at odds with his home country's government and did not present any evidence that his home country's gov- ernment had attributed a specific political opinion to him. In Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996), the court held that in order to show that prosecution for unlawful departure constitutes "per- secution," the applicant "must prove that he is one of the persons at whom the illegal departure statute was directed--persons who flee their homeland for political reasons." Id. at 430 (citations omitted). See
119 F.3d 1055, *1069; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18456, **46
Page 17
also id. at 426. The majority endorses the proposi- tion that "if the asylum-seeker's motives in leaving his or her country were 'related' to 'political opinion'
. . . prosecution under unlawful departure laws can constitute persecution." Maj. Op. at 11. However, the majority errs in applying it to this case, because, as I have explained in the text, there is no evidence that Chang's conduct was based on any political opinion. Moreover, courts accepting the "imputed opinion" theory have not merely presumed that a foreign government has attributed a political opin- ion to the applicant; rather, they have required that the applicant actually "produce evidence of such a mistaken imputation." Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801,
806 (9th Cir. 1996). See Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d
375, 379 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on evidence that
"the police imputed to Singh the beliefs of the Sikh separatists and harmed him on that basis"); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying
on evidence that the applicant was tortured because he was suspected of being a Sikh separatist); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 198 (re- lying on evidence that the Ton Ton Macoutes "at- tributed subversive views" to Desir). Under Elias- Zacarias the fact that the Chinese government may have a political motive in prosecuting Chang does not show that the prosecution would be "on account of " Chang's "political opinion." See 502 U.S. at
482. And Chang did not present evidence sufficient to compel the conclusion that the Chinese govern- ment has imputed a political opinion to him. See id.
("Nor is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously be- lieved that Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based").
He was a dissenter against eleven judges on the human and poitical asylum rights of a former Communist national seeking refuge in America in the past decade.
We see he sides with the State in all issues. The Communist state at that.